

The Role of Local Religious Figures (*Kiai*) in Strengthening Political Participation in Post-new Order Madura 1998-2019


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Abstrak

This research aims to conduct an in-depth study of the role and existence of local Madurese religious figures in strengthening political participation in Madura. The local religious figures referred to are kiai, who are known to have a significant role and influence in Madura. The method used in this research is the historical method which includes four steps, namely: heuristics, source criticism, interpretation, and historiography. The results of this research show that kiai in Madura have a significant role and influence in strengthening community participation in general elections, both at the regional and presidential elections. The role and influence of the kiai are obtained because the Madurese people are known to have respect and obedience towards the kiai. In the context of Madurese society, kiai are people who have strong religious knowledge, so when Madurese chooses leaders, they tend to use the kiai's political attitudes and choices as role models or political references.

Penelitian ini bertujuan melakukan kajian mendalam terhadap peran dan eksistensi tokoh agama lokal Madura dalam memperkuat partisipasi politik di Madura. Tokoh agama lokal dimaksud adalah kalangan kiai, yang selama ini dikenal memiliki peran dan pengaruh signifikan di Madura. Adapun metode yang digunakan dalam penelitian ini adalah metode sejarah yang di dalamnya mencakup empat langkah, yakni: heuristik, kritik sumber, interpretasi, dan historiografi. Hasil penelitian ini menunjukkan bahwa kiai di Madura memiliki peran dan pengaruh signifikan memperkuat partisipasi masyarakat terhadap pemilihan umum, baik pemilihan di level Pilkada maupun Pilpres. Peran dan pengaruh kiai tersebut diperoleh karena masyarakat Madura dikenal mempunyai sikap hormat dan patuh terhadap kiai. Dalam konteks masyarakat Madura, kiai adalah orang yang memiliki ilmu agama yang mumpuni, ketika orang Madura memilih pemimpin, maka mereka cenderung menjadikan sikap dan pilihan politik para kiai sebagai panutan atau referensi politik.

INTRODUCTION

The transition of power on May 21, 1998, from President Soeharto to B.J. Habibie brought major changes to the political system in Indonesia. This change can be seen in the political transformation from previously authoritarian to democratic. Since then, the process of democratization has been wide open, starting from changes in the centralization of the central government to regional governments, implementing more democratic elections, implementing a multi-party system, freedom of the press, and making the military organizational apparatus politically neutral.¹

After the collapse of the new order was replaced by the reform era, the political system no longer used the executive-heavy (dominant executive) and legislative-heavy (dominant legislature) political formats as practiced by the old order and the new order.² The era of reform of the political system does not focus on or dominate any one state institution, everything is more democratic. Therefore, at the beginning of the reform, many political parties were established as a response and an indication that democracy had been opened without centralization and control of power. The number of political parties at that time was 184, of which 141 parties received approval and legal entities. However, only 48 political parties met the requirements to participate in the political contestation in the 1999 election. Continuing in the following year, the number of parties experienced an increase in quantity to face the 2004 election contestation. There were approximately 200 political parties, 50 parties as legal entities, and 24 parties participating in the 2004 election. Unlike the 2009 election, political parties experienced a decrease in number compared to the general election. Previously, only 132 political parties and around 22 parties passed the verification.³

Likewise, in the 2014 election, the General Elections Commission (*KPU/Komisi Pemilihan Umum*) decided as many as 46 political parties to register to take part in the 2014 election. Some of them are new parties, first participating in elections, or just changing names. 9 (nine) other parties participated in the 2009 elections and won seats in the 2009-2014 DPR. Of the 46 parties that passed factual verification, only 12 political parties could take part in the 2014 election.⁴

¹ Kacung Marijan, *Sistem Politik Indonesia: Konsolidasi Demokrasi Pasca Orde Baru* (Jakarta: Kencana, 2019).

² Purwoko, 'Sistem Politik Dan Pemerintahan Indonesia Setelah Reformasi', *Jurnal Ilmu Politik* 1, no. 1 (2010), <https://doi.org/10.14710/politika.1.1.2010.104-117>.

³ Lili Romli, 'Reformasi Partai Politik dan Sistem Kepartaian di Indonesia', *Politica* 2, no. 2 (2011): 200, <http://dx.doi.org/10.22212/jp.v2i2.292>.

⁴ 'Komisi Pemilihan Umum (KPU) Indonesia', n.d., <https://www.kpu.go.id/>.

As for the 2019 election, political parties that passed verification were 14 parties contesting in the 2019 election.⁵

The number of political parties (political parties) and the openness of the 1999 to 2019 elections, it is proof that democracy in Indonesia has been going well in accordance with the law and the aspirations of the people who want democracy. Since then (after the New Order), democracy has provided an opportunity for civil society to participate in politics in Indonesia. Public participation in the political arena is a national policy, anyone may participate, regardless of social status, whether the grassroots, clerics, or *kiai*.⁶

On the basis of democracy, all levels of society and the clergy participate and play a role as checks and balances in the political vortex, including the *kiai* and *Ulama* of Madura. It is very interesting when talking about *kiai* Madura and its relation to politics. On the one hand, the *kiai* is the leader of the people and the leader of Islamic educational institutions (*Pesantren*), on the other hand, the *kiai* is the political elite. Meanwhile, the Madurese community's respect and reverence for the figure of *kiai* is extraordinary. These two variables, *kiai*, leaders of the people, as well as political actors, influence political stability in Madura, both in the election of the village head, regional election, governor election, and even the presidential election. This dual function becomes the scope of discussion in articles written by researchers.

In fact, many studies on Madura from the aspects of anthropology, history, and sociology have been studied before, both researchers from the West (Europe), and domestic and local Madurese researchers. First, Huub de Jonge (1989), *Handelaren en Handlangers: Ondernemerschap, Economische Ontwikkeling en Islam op Madura*. Jonge believes that Islamic political parties in Madura have the most followers. The indicator is the 1955 election, the Madurese people chose the political party which has affiliations with large organizations with the largest organization in Indonesia, *Nahdhatul Ulama* (NU).⁷ Second, Kuntowijoyo (1980), in his Doctoral promotion at Columbia University, wrote "*Social Change in An Agrarian Society: Madura, 1850-1940*", in one of the chapters, Kuntowijowo

⁵ 'Keputusan Komisi Pemilihan Umum Nomor 58/Pl.01.1-Kpt/03/Kpu/Ii/2018 Tentang Penetapan Partai Politik Peserta Pemilihan Umum Anggota Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah Provinsi Dan Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah Kabupaten/Kota Tahun 20', n.d.

⁶ Anwar Ilmar, 'Pembangunan Dan Partisipasi Politik Di Indonesia Pasca Orde Baru: Dari Teknokratis Ke Populis?', *Jurnal Polinter Prodi Ilmu Politik FISIP UTA'45 Jakarta* 3, no. 1 (2017): 3.

⁷ Huub de Jonge, *Handelaren En Handlangers: Ondernemerschap, Economische Ontwikkeling En Islam Op Madura* (Leiden: Koninklijk Instituut Voor Taal, Landen Volkenkunde, 1988).

discussed *kiai* as village elites. The religious knowledge they have has an impact on the people in the villages becoming educated.⁸ Third, Zainuddin Syarif (2020), *Religion and Politics: Constellation of Thoughts between Cultural and Structural Groups among Islamic Boarding School kiai in Madura*. In his study, in Pamekasan Madura there are two contemporary Islamic mass organizations, namely FKM (*Forum kiai Muda Madura/Forum of Young kiais of Madura*) and Gesper (*Gerakan Santri Rahmatan Lil'Alamin/Mercy to All Creation Santri and Students Movement*). Both are Islamist movements that have recently emerged in Pamekasan and represent two major local religious groups, the structural NU and the cultural NU. NU Structural was represented by Gesper, and NU Cultural was represented by FKM. Not infrequently both of them are involved in religious and political issues, starting from the issue of Nusantara Islam and legal issues whether or not to choose leaders from non-Muslims.⁹

What this research has in common with previous researchers is that the object of the research location is both in Madura and discusses *kiai*, religion, and religious traditions that are related to politics in Madura. The difference is that the time period determined by the researcher is from post-New Order 1998 to 2019. Meanwhile, previous researchers, especially Kontowijoyo's study, took the period before Independence. Researchers *kiai* and Huub, do not specify a time period and are not a historical study. Of course, in terms of methods, it is also different from this research. Therefore, the aim of this research is to determine the role of *kiai* or *Ulama* in the political maelstrom in Madura after the New Order.

Method

This research is a literature review using historical methods. Characteristics of the historical method, tracing data sources thoroughly and looking for older sources.¹⁰ Meanwhile, the aim of historical research is to reconstruct past events systematically, objectively, interestingly, and correctly and in accordance with historical facts.¹¹ As for the data, this research uses two types of research data, namely primary data and secondary data. Primary data in research comes from

⁸ Kontowijoyo, *Social Change in An Agrarian Society: Madura, 1850-1940* (Columbia: Faculty of Political Science, 1998).

⁹ Zainuddin Syarif and Abd Hannan, 'Agama Dan Politik: Konstelasi Pemikiran Antara Kelompok Kultural Dan Struktural Pada Kalangan Kiai *Pesantren* Di Madura', *Jurnal Dakwah Dan Pengembangan Sosial Kemanusiaan* 11, no. 1 (2020): 47-74., <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.32923/maw.v11i1.1174>.

¹⁰ {Citation}

¹¹ Tarjo, *Metode Penelitian Sistem 3X Baca* (Yogyakarta: Grup Penerbitan CV Budi Utama, 2019).

field data, especially those obtained from observation activities carried out in a participatory manner. In addition, the primary data in this study is also in the form of interview data with informants, both key and supporting informants. As for secondary data, this type of data is obtained from various sources of literature. The sources of literature in this study are limited to several types such as books, journals, scientific articles, and a number of previous research results.¹²

The historical method includes four steps.¹³ *First*, Heuristics, the process of collecting sources. The primary source used in this research is the results of counting ballots from the KPU (*Komisi Pemilihan Umum*/General Election Commission) and utilizing contemporary online media news sources. Meanwhile, secondary sources in the form of books, scientific articles, and writings that are relevant to this research were obtained from Google Scholar, Sinta, and the Pamekasan district public library. *Second*, source criticism, by means of external and internal criticism. *Third*, is interpretation, and the final step is historiography, presenting data in written form from the results of the interpretation.

RESULT AND DISCUSSION

Concepts About *Kiai* and Politics

Before discussing the role of *kiai* in the political maelstrom in Madura, the researcher first discusses the meaning of *kiai* and politics. The word *kiai* comes from the Old Javanese language "*kiya-kira*" which means a respected person.¹⁴ The term *kiai* in traditional Javanese society refers to charismatic religious figures. The calling of religious figures in each region in Indonesia is different, the people of West Java (Sunda) call them *Ajengan*, *Tengku* (Aceh), *Buya* (Minangkabau), *Tuan Guru* (Nusa Tenggara, South Kalimantan, East Kalimantan, and Central Kalimantan), *Sheikh* (Tapanuli), in Madura itself it is called *Keaeh*.¹⁵ Even though the pronunciation in each region is different, the substance is the same. The status of bearing the name *kiai* is an honorary title for religious figures.

Meanwhile, what is meant by politics, seen from etymology, comes from the Greek word *polis* which means a city with city-state status.¹⁶ According to

¹² *Handbook of Qualitative Research.*, Handbook of Qualitative Research. (Thousand Oaks, CA, US: Sage Publications, Inc, 1994).

¹³ Khoirul Huda, *Buku Ajar Metode Penulisan Sejarah* (Madiun: UNIPMA Press Universitas PGRI Madiun, 2021).

¹⁴ M. Syahran Jailani, '*Kepemimpinan Kiai Dalam Merevitalisasi Pesantren*', 2016.

¹⁵ Mansur Hidayat, '*Model Komunikasi Kiai Dengan Santri Di Pesantren*', *Jurnal Komunikasi ASPIKOM* 2, no. 6 (2016): 385–95, <http://dx.doi.org/10.24329/aspikom.v2i6.89>.

¹⁶ Muhammad Muthari Ramadhani and DKK, *Pengantar Ilmu Politik* (Bandung: Widina Bhakti Persada Bandung, 2022).

Miriam Budiardjo, politics is an effort to get a good life. Likewise what Yusa Djuyandi stated, is almost the same as Budiardjo's opinion, politics is a way to fight for common interests through the state, apart from that politics is part of the art of change and transformation in a peaceful democratic country.¹⁷ Simply put, politics is any activity that is directly related to power with the aim of influencing and maintaining the order of society with power.¹⁸ Or it could also be interpreted as politics to gain power.¹⁹

The two definitions above, it categorize the position of *kiai* as religious figures who involve themselves in gaining power through the state. If a *kiai* involves himself in gaining power by gathering the masses to gain support from the people or society, then the *kiai* is called a practical political actor. However, if *kiai* are involved in power with the aim of regulating the state and nation so that it runs in accordance with the law, as is done by members of parliament, then *kiai* is called political practitioners. However, if *kiai* studies, observes, and observes in accordance with methodological and scientific approaches, then *kiai* is called a political scientist.²⁰

Madurese People's Respect for *Kiai*

In the dynamics of Madurese society, *kiai* have high social stratification, not only in the religious aspect but in all aspects of community life. This is in accordance with the Madurese saying "*buppa', babbu', guruh, rato*" (*fathers, mothers, teachers, and government*).²¹ This proverb reflects the hierarchy of respect the Madurese people have for parents, *kiai*, and leaders. *buppa' babbu'* (parents), represents the family, *ghuruh* represents the *kiai*, and *rato* represents the government or ruler.²²

The structure of *buppa'* and *babbu'* (parents) are in the first structure. Parents or family are the most important pillars whose dignity and honor must

¹⁷ Miriam Modiardjo, *Dasar-Dasar Ilmu Politik* (Jakarta: PT Gramedia Pustaka Utama, 2007).

¹⁸ Abdulkadir B Nambo and Muhamad Rusdiyanto Puluhuluwa, 'Memahami Tentang Beberapa Konsep Politik (Suatu Telaah Dari Sistem Politik)', *MIMBAR: Jurnal Sosial Pembangunan* XXI, no. 2 (2005): 262–85, <https://doi.org/10.29313/mimbar.v21i2.177>.

¹⁹ Yusa Djuyandi, *Pengantar Ilmu Politik* (Depok: PT Rajagrafindo Persada, 2017).

²⁰ Tommy Suprpto and Widyaswara Madya, *Politik Redaksi Berita: Menguak Latar Belakang Teks Berita Media* (Jakarta: Pustaka Kaiswaran, 2010).

²¹ Muhammad Kosim, 'Kiai Dan Blater (Elite Lokal Dalam Masyarakat Madura)', *KARSA: Jurnal Sosial Dan Budaya Keislaman* XII, no. 2 (2012): 149–60, <https://doi.org/10.19105/karsa.v12i2.139>.

²² Muhammad Afdillah, *Dari Masjid Ke Panggung Politik : Melacak Akar-Akar Kekerasan Agama Antara Komunitas Sunni Dan Syiah Di Sampang Jawa Timur* (Yogyakarta: CRCS (Center for Religious and Cross-cultural Studies), 2016).

be maintained.²³ Because there is a religio-cultural structure, it is an obligation recommended by religion for a person to be filial to the parents who have cared for and raised him.²⁴ In certain contexts, Madurese respects other people as well as respect their families. Vice versa, insulting others, is the same as insulting the whole family. Respect for others for the Madurese manifests and reflects respect for *Buppa' Babbu'* (Father and Mother).²⁵

The second structure is *Guruh* (Teacher), this title is better known as *kiai* or Ustadz. Socially in Madurese society, *kiai*'s position is higher than other ordinary people, even higher than government bureaucrats and state officials. Because the *kiai* has religious knowledge and at the same time is an educator (teacher) who teaches religious knowledge to the people. Its existence must be respected, not disturbed, humiliated, let alone despised. As bad as Madurese are, whether they are *blatir*, thieves, or drunkards, they never forget the thunder (*kiai*), they still respect him. This fact indicates that the *kiai* cannot be separated from the life of the Madurese people. Because all Madurese activities require *kiai*, not only in the religious aspect but in other aspects. There is a tradition that is deeply rooted among Madurese people, when Madurese people carry out activities related to work, trading, farming, fishing, or other professions, they always involve *kiai* to ask for blessings and prayers, so that the work they carry out is in line with expectations.²⁶

In addition, the supporting factors for the respect of the Madurese people for *kiai* are based on the Madurese religious tradition, which is predominantly *nahdliyin* with the characteristics of NU, *tahlilan*, *maulidan*, salvation, *wiridan*, regular recitation, *istighosah*, and other religious traditions. All of these activities require the *kiai* to lead the traditional religious events carried out by the

²³ ST Kamilah and Oksiana Jatningsih, 'Sosok Kiai Dalam Konstruksi Intelektual Muda Bangkalan', *Kajian Moral Dan Kewarganegaraan* 5, no. 3 (2017): 735–48, <https://doi.org/10.26740/kmkn.v5n03.p%25p>.

²⁴ Moh Hefni, 'Bhuppa' Bhabhu' Ghuru Rato (Studi Konstruktivisme-Strukturalis Tentang Hierarki Kepatuhan Dalam Budaya Masyarakat Madura)', *KARSA XI*, no. 1 (2007).

²⁵ Sukron Romadhon, 'Kiai Bagi Orang Madura: Proceedings of 4th International Conference on Islamic Studies (ICONIS)', *November 18, 2020, IAIN Madura, Pamekasan, East Java, Indonesia*, 2020.

²⁶ Ali Topan, 'Respons Aliansi Ulama Madura (AUMA) Terhadap Dinamika Politik Keagamaan Di Pamekasan Madura', *Jurnal Pendidikan Ilmu Pengetahuan Sosial Dan Ilmu-Ilmu Sosial* 4, no. 1 (2022): 94, <https://doi.org/10.19105/ejpis.v4i1.5576>.

Madurese community. So, the Madurese people's respect for *kiai* has a coherent line of obedience in carrying out religious teachings and religious traditions.²⁷

The final structure of the Madurese proverbial hierarchy is Ratoh (government/ruler). Madurese people respect the government which has been legally elected by the people through general elections and through a process of written agreement between political parties or a combination of political parties to create a permanent coalition to create government effectiveness. Historically, the Madurese people's love and nationalism for the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI/Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia) cannot be doubted. The proof is that the sacrifices of the Madurese people in defending Indonesia's independence were not only material, they also risked their lives. When the Linggarjati agreement failed, Madura was declared in danger of war against the Dutch colonialists who wanted to regain control of the Madurese region. Seeing Dutch colonial troops arriving in the western part of Madura (Bangkalan) on August 4, 1947, the Madurese fighters immediately fought back against the Dutch troops. So a battle broke out between the Madurese fighters and the Dutch army. Due to this battle, Lieutenant Kaffa and Corporal R.P Achmad died in order to defend the Republic of Indonesia.

Kiai and His Role in Strengthening Democratic Political Participation in Madura

In a community or social group, there must be one actor who plays a role and influences the other members. In Islam, *kiai* as actors play a role in regulating people's lives from all aspects, religious, social, and even political.²⁸ The inclusion of the *kiai* in the dynamics of social life, including politics, often determines constituents' interest in the choices made by the *kiai*. This cannot be separated from the character of the *kiai* who is a role model for many people and has excellent religious knowledge and charisma. Moreover, the Madurese people are known for their high respect for *kiai*. So it is very easy for *kiai* to influence and mobilize society in politics in Madura. However, there is a note in this study, not all Madurese *kiai* are involved in politics, there are also closed Madura *kiai* who don't want to know about politics.

The role of *kiai* Madura is not only as a political observer, but also involving himself in the vortex of practical politics and becoming a political practitioner, in order to gain power and become a leader in government, and can

²⁷ H. Muhammad Samsuddin, *History Of Madura: Sejarah, Budaya Dan Ajaran Luhur Masyarakat Madura* (Yogyakarta: Araska, 2019).

²⁸ Tim UGM Press, *Pembangunan Sosial Dan Kesejahteraan: Jejak Pemikiran, Pendekatan, Dan Isu Kontemporer* (Yogyakarta: Gadjah Mada University Press, 2022).

be part of formulating regulations for the benefit of the people in accordance with the law. The proof is that four districts in Madura (Bangkalan, Sampang, Pamekasan, Sumenep) were once led by a religious figure (*kiai*) to become a regional leader (Regent). Bangkalan Regency, the 2013-2018 period was led by the *kiai* clan, K. Makmun Ibnu Fuad. The son of the previous regent, KH. R. Fuad Amin Imron, 2003-2008 and 2008-2013. Likewise for Sampang, the 2013-2018 period was led by KH. Fannan Hasib. In Pamekasan it is more or less the same, H. Baddrut Tamam 2018-2023, the previous regent Kholilurrahman also has the *kiai* breed. Moreover, the eastern tip of Madura (Sumenep), was once led by a very influential *kiai* for the 2010-2015 period, namely KH. A. Busyro Karim.²⁹

According to Abdul Wahid Hasyim, the aim of the *kiai* was to be involved in practical politics, during a scientific oration for the inauguration of a professor at the State Islamic University of Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta, he said that there were three factors behind the involvement of the *kiai* on the political, religious, economic and socio-cultural stage. *First*, religion, *kiai*'s involvement in practical politics is interpreted as the caliph's service in open earth for the benefit of the people to obtain a just, prosperous, and prosperous life. *Second*, economically, *kiai* are encouraged to strengthen and fight for the economy of people who are still marginalized. *Third*, socio-cultural, grounding, and institutionalizing the ideology of *ahlussunnah wal-jamaah*.³⁰

From the three factors above, the contextualization of Madura from a religious perspective, the *kiai* has a dual function of serving the people in the religious realm, on the other hand serving the people is general, formal, and structural. In the economic realm, in this context, *kiai* is required to have the capacity as a formal leader in government to advocate or defend the people's economy which is still far from prosperous through the hands of the power they have. Here there must be reciprocity, the *kiai* as a formal leader is chosen by the people as a representative, considered to understand religion, can be trusted, and is trustworthy, so the *kiai* must act according to the wishes of the person represented. Likewise in the socio-cultural context, the Madurese community is predominantly Muslim and has the *Nahdlatul Ulama* (NU) organization with the *ahlussunnah wal-jamaah* wing. The *kiai*'s job is to maintain the religious traditions

²⁹ Zainuddin Syarif, 'Pergeseran Perilaku Politik Kiai Dan Santri Di Pamekasan Madura', *Jurnal Pemikiran Islam* 16, no. 2 (2016): 293-311, <http://dx.doi.org/10.21154/al-tahrir.v16i2.500>.

³⁰ Abdul Wahid Hasyim, 'Orasi Profesor Abdul Wahid Hasyim: Ini Latar Belakang Keterlibatan Politik Kiai', Universitas Islam Negeri Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta, 2022, <https://www.uinjkt.ac.id/orasi-profesor-abdul-wahid-hasyim-ini-latar-belakang-keterlibatan-politik-kiai/>.

that already exist in Madura with the characteristics of NU, *tahlilan*, *sholawatan*, and *maulidan*. Madurese people are fanatical about religious sects and religious organizations, other than NU, which are considered wrong. Sometimes Madurese people, when asked about religion, simultaneously answer NU, not Islam. This indicates that the NU organization and its religious traditions have become flesh and blood of the Madurese people.³¹

Apart from being practical political actors, the role of *kiai* in Madura determines victory in the regional elections, gubernatorial elections, and presidential elections. In the election of regional elections (*Pilkada*), as said above, the *kiai* went directly to become a candidate for the regional elections in Madura and at the same time asked for support from the community through other *kiai*, especially *kiai* who had Islamic boarding schools, because *kiai* had Islamic educational institutions (*pesantren*/Islamic boarding schools) is more influential than *kiai Langgar*, *kiai* who only teaches the Koran in *Langgar*. So it is not uncommon for a *kiai* or someone who is not a *kiai* when running for leadership in the government to conduct a political safari to the *kiai* of a *pesantren* to ask for blessings and prayers, and no less important to ask for support.

The role of the Madurese *kiai* not only influences the regional elections, it also influences the East Java (East Java) gubernatorial elections. Hundreds of Madura *kiai* supported the pair Khofifah Indar Parawansa and Emil Elestianto Dardak in the 2018 East Java Governor election. The support was in the form of a fatwa and was signed directly by all *pesantren* administrators in Madura at ma'had At-Taroqqi, Sampang. Support for Khofifah-Emil was read directly by the deputy chairman of the East Java PWNU (Pimpinan Wilayah *Nahdlatul Ulama*/Nadlatul *Ulama* Regional Management). In this fatwa, fardu ain for the people of East Java chose Khofifah-Emil. This is because the Khofifah-Emil couple is considered capable of making East Java developed, just, and prosperous.

Evidently, with the support of the 2018 East Java Pilgub Madura *Ulama* for the Khofifah-Emil pair, from the four districts in Madura, almost the majority chose the pair Khofifah Indar Parawansa and Emil Elestianto Dardak. Sumenep received 248,074 votes, and Ipul-Puti received 240,683 votes.³² Pamekasan Khofifah-Emil won by a landslide with a total of 343,494 votes, and Ipul-Puti

³¹ Republika, 'Ratusan Kiai Di Madura Dukung Khofifah-Emil', 2018, <https://news.republika.co.id/berita/nasional/pilkada/18/05/19/p8z86a428-ratusan-kiai-di-madura-dukung-khofifahemil?>

³² *Komisi Pemilihan Umum* (KPU) Kabupaten Sumenep, 'No Title', n.d., <https://kab-sumenep.kpu.go.id/>.

received 146,684 votes.³³ Central Madura (Sampang), Khofifah-Emil got 339,222 votes, and candidate pair number two Ipul-Puti got 312,331 votes.³⁴ Of the four districts in Madura, the Khofifah-Emil pair only lost in Bangkalan Regency with a total of 261,467, while their political opponent Ipul-Pati received 271,088 votes.³⁵

There were four factors behind the victory of Khofifah Indar Parawansa and Emil Elestianto Dardak over their political rivals Saifullah Yusuf and Puti Guntur Soekarno, the 2018 East Java Pilgub, namely, Islamic boarding school politics, work programs, support for political parties, and support for Muslims.³⁶ *First*, the existence of *pesantren*, *pesantren* are traditional Islamic educational institutions managed by *kiai*. In the political arena, *kiai* who have Islamic boarding schools are far more influential than *kiai* who do not have Islamic boarding schools. Islamic boarding schools are known as the *Nahdlatul Ulama* (NU) tradition.³⁷ Apart from being known as NU, Madura is also known as the Island of a Thousand Islamic Boarding Schools affiliated with NU. Meanwhile, Khofifah as head of the East Java NU *Muslimat*, it is only natural that Madurese chose Khofifah, because there are organizational similarities. Khofifah uses the NU *Muslimat* organization as her political power. The NU *Muslimat* network is deeply rooted in East Java, including Madura, which became Khofifah's main capital in winning the 2018 East Java gubernatorial election.³⁸

Second, work programs, several of Khofifah's work programs reduce poverty rates in East Java, including Madura, and health services. Khofifah hopes to expand the provincial government's hospital in Pamekasan from type C to type B. With this aim, Madurese people can get fast health, both qualitatively and quantitatively. In the field of education services, the Khofifah-Emil initiative of

³³ *Komisi Pemilihan Umum* (KPU) Kabupaten Pamekasan, 'No Title', n.d., <https://kab-pamekasan.kpu.go.id/>.

³⁴ *Komisi Pemilihan Umum* (KPU) Kabupaten Sampang, 'No Title', n.d., <https://kab-sampang.kpu.go.id/>.

³⁵ *Komisi Pemilihan Umum* (KPU) Kabupaten Bangkalan, 'No Title', n.d., <https://kab-bangkalan.kpu.go.id/>.

³⁶ Ahmad Bahrul Anshori, 'The Political Strategy of *Pesantren* in the 2018 East Java Governor Election: Case Study of the Victory of the Candidate Pair of Khofifah-Emil on the Madura Island of East Java', n.d.

³⁷ Ferry Muham m adsyah Siregar and Saidin Ern as, 'Dam Pak Keterlibatan Pesan Tren Dalam Po Litik: Studi Kasus Pesan Tren Di Yo Gyakarta', *Kontekstualita* 25, no. 2 (2010): 208.

³⁸ Silkania Swarizona and DKK, *Jaringan Penggunaan Politik Muslimat NU Sebagai Tim Sukses Pasangan Khofifah Indar Parawansa Dan Emil Elestianto Dardak Pada Pemilihan Gubernur Jawa Timur Tahun 2018 = Pemanfaatan Jaringan Politik Muslimat NU Sebagai Tim Sukses Calon Khofifah Indar Parawa* (Universitas Indonesia Library, 21AD).

21-700 GTT (Non-Permanent Teachers) teachers who are still non-permanent employees (PTT) in East Java including Madura from four districts will receive assistance from the APBD of East Java Province. Likewise, Khofifah's poverty alleviation work program intervenes in poor families over 70 years old through the Family Hope Program (PKH/*Program Keluarga Harapan*).³⁹

Third, political party support, the Khofifah-Emil pair is supported by a coalition of Democratic parties, Golkar party, Nasdem party, Hanura party, PKPI party (non-parliamentary, and PPP party.⁴⁰ Of all the political parties that support Khofifah-Emil's candidacy in the 2018 East Java gubernatorial election, The most influential party in Madura is the PPP party. We know that the United Development Party (PPP), whose symbol is the Kaaba, Madurese is fanatical about religious symbols.⁴¹ This image of the Kaaba contributes to the interest of the Madurese people in choosing the Khofifah-Emil gubernatorial election. East Java 2018. *Fourth*, is the support of Muslims, and the last factor is related to the first factor, namely *kiai*, Islamic boarding schools, and religious organizations. The support of Muslims in Madura for Khofifah-Emil can be seen from Madurese political actors, almost all *kiai* in Madura have an NU religious organization, with the characteristics of a *pesantren*, as well as all Madurese who are majority Muslims and belong to NU organizations.⁴² Meanwhile, Khofifah is part of the *Nahdliyin* community which is very well known in East Java.

Kiai Madura's political power is not only in the Pilbup and Pilgub, it has an influence on the Presidential Election (Pilpres). In 2014, Madurese *Ulama* supported the presidential candidate pair Prabowo Subianto and Hatta Rajasa, against Joko Widodo and M. Jusuf Kalla. Factors in Prabowo Subianto's victory in the 2014 Presidential Election in Madura. *First*, the influence of religious figures (*Ulama* or *kiai*) supports Prabowo. This support was conveyed during Istighosah at one of the ma'hads, in Pamekasan, Madura, East Java. *Second*, Prabowo has a firm nature. Prabowo's disposition or character is in accordance with the character of the Madurese people. *Third*, the support of the Habaibs for

³⁹ Indonesia sekretariat Kabinet Republik, 'Inilah Program 99 Hari Pertama Khofifah Sebagai Gubernur Jatim 2019-2024', Indonesia sekretariat Kabinet Republik, n.d.

⁴⁰ Dinas Kominfo Provinsi Jawa Timur, 'Pasangan Khofifah - Emil Resmi Daftar Pilgub Jatim 2018 Ke KPU', 2018, <https://kominfo.jatimprov.go.id/read/umum/pasangan-khofifah-emil-resmi-daftar-pilgub-jatim-2018-ke-kpu>.

⁴¹ Abd Hannan and Kudrat Abdillah, 'Hegemoni Religio-Kekuasaan Dan Transformasi Sosial Mobilisasi Jaringan Kekuasaan Dan Keagamaan Kiai Dalam Dinamika Sosio-Kultural Masyarakat', *Sosiologi Budaya* 16, no. 1 (2019), <http://dx.doi.org/10.24014/sb.v16i1.7037>.

⁴² Samsuddin, *History Of Madura: Sejarah, Budaya Dan Ajaran Luhur Masyarakat Madura*.

Prabowo influenced the people of Madura, so that Prabowo won the dominant vote in the 2014 Madura Presidential Election.⁴³

Prabowo's victory in Madura continued in the 2019 presidential election. One of the reasons for Prabowo's victory was the same as in the 2014 presidential election, namely obtaining the blessing and support of *kiai* and *Ulama* in Madura. The Madurese in making political choices or electing government leaders depends on what the *kiai* says. Apart from the *kiai* factor, the issue of religion in the 2019 presidential election determined Prabowo's victory in Madura.⁴⁴ Many on social media present religious issues that doubt one of the candidate pairs about their Islam.⁴⁵ Meanwhile, for the Madurese, religion is taboo or something that is non-negotiable. And religion for the Madurese as a membership identity, if there is a Madurese who is not Muslim, then his membership as a Madurese automatically disappears.⁴⁶

The 2024 Presidential Election Learns from the History of the 2014-2019 Presidential Election in Madura

The upcoming 2024 general election for President and Vice President will be fierce, because one of the 2014-2019 candidates will be a candidate again in the 2024 Presidential Election which will be held on 14 February 2024.⁴⁷ So far, there are three names that have been confirmed as presidential candidates. The first came from an old fighter in the 2014-2019 presidential election, Prabowo Subianto, a party supporting Gerindra with 78 seats, Golkar with 85 seats, PAN with 44 seats, PKB with 58 seats and was supported by parties outside the PBB parliament.⁴⁸ The two presidential candidates for 2024 come from the former Governor of DKI Jakarta 2017-2022 Anies Rasyid Baswedan, the party that supports Nasdem 59 seats, PKS 50 seats, and Democrats 54 seats, and Parati

⁴³ Liputan6, 'Didukung Kiai Se-Madura, Prabowo Yakin Menang Pilpres', n.d., <https://www.liputan6.com/indonesia-baru/read/2068108/didukung-kiai-se-madura-prabowo-yakin-menang-pilpres>.

⁴⁴ Nur Elya Anggraini, *Mereka Yang Rentan & Butuh Pengakuan: Potrit Pemilu Di Madura Dan Masyarakat Adat Di Jawa Timur* (Media Sahabat Cendekia: surabaya, 2019).

⁴⁵ Latief Wijaya, *Mencari Madura* (Jakarta: Bidik Phronesis Publishing, 2013).

⁴⁶ Muhammad Kosim, 'Kiai dan Blater (Elite Lokal Dalam Masyarakat Madura)', *KARSA* XII, no. 2 (2007): 162, <https://doi.org/10.19105/karsa.v12i2.139>.

⁴⁷ 'Komisi Pemilihan Umum (KPU) Indonesia'.

⁴⁸ CNN Indonesia, 'Daftar Partai Pendukung Prabowo Capres 2024', 2023, <https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20230814081740-617-985668/daftar-partai-pendukung-prabowo-capres-2024>.

Umat. The last one is Ganjar Pranowo, a party that supports PDIP with 128 seats, PPP with 19 seats, Hanura, and the Perindo party.⁴⁹

Interestingly, the 2014-2019 presidential election in Madura has always been won by Prabowo, the upcoming 2024 presidential candidate. Prabowo's victory in the 2014-2019 Madura Presidential Election, as stated by the researcher above, received support from Madurese *kiai* and *Ulama*, and there are similarities in character with the Madurese, namely Prabowo's assertiveness represents the character of the Madurese who are known for their firm nature and never give up. With firmness and never giving up, Prabowo, despite losing twice in the 2014 presidential election against Joko Widodo and losing again in 2019 to the same enemy, Prabowo is determined to nominate again as President in 2024 through general elections.

Meanwhile, Anies Baswedan, Prabowo's political opponent in the upcoming 2024 presidential election, also has the same identity as the Madurese people, who are religious in carrying out the teachings of Islam. We know that Anies Baswedan is descended from an Islamic figure who fought for Indonesian independence, A.R, Baswedan, of Arab descent.⁵⁰ A.R Baswedan was the first diplomat to succeed in obtaining de facto recognition of Indonesia's independence from Egypt. From lineage, Anies Baswedan already has the blood of a leader and fighter. Therefore, Anies Baswedan led the Capital City of Jakarta from 2017-2022.

On the other hand, the presidential candidate from the PDIP party, Ganjar Pranowo, does not have the same characteristics as Madurese. However, the Madurese people can see Ganjar Pranowo's performance during his time as the number one person in Central Java (Governor of Central Java). Ganjar's achievements as Governor of Central Java are one of the only public services and quality of government, so far Central Java has 28 MPPs (Public Service Malls). In terms of government quality, to prevent acts of corruption, collusion, and hypocrisy in Central Java from the provincial, city, and district levels, then treat e-governance.⁵¹

⁴⁹ CNBC, 'Koalisi Terkini Partai Pendukung Capres 2024', 2023, <https://www.cnbcindonesia.com/news/20230814121940-16-462713/koalisi-terkini-partai-pendukung-capres-2024>.

⁵⁰ Inews.id, 'Silsilah Keluarga Baswedan, Buyut Moyang Anies Baswedan Ternyata Kaya Raya: Ini Warisannya', 2022, <https://www.inews.id/news/nasional/silsilah-keluarga-baswedan-buyut-moyang-anies-baswedan-ternyata-kaya-raya-ini-warisannya/2>.

⁵¹ Berita Satu, 'Ini Sederet Prestasi Dan Terobosan Ganjar Pranowo Di Jawa Tengah', n.d., <https://www.beritasatu.com/bersatu-kawal-pemilu/1039901/ini-sederet-prestasi-dan-terobosan-ganjar-pranowo-di-jawa-tengah>.

Likewise, Anies Baswedan has the potential to win in the 2024 Madura Presidential Election. The indicators are, the symbol of Islam, is religious and there is starting to support from *ulama* or *kiai* in Madura. So far, four charismatic and influential *ulama* figures in Madura have supported Anies' candidacy for President, namely KH Abdullah Khon Thabroni (Bangkalan), KH Faurok Alawy (Sampang), KH Ali Karrar Sinhaji (Pamekasan) and KH Jurjis Muzzammil (Sumenep).⁵² Reporting from Bharawa Online (2023), a line of *ulama*, *kiai*, and Koran teachers in Madura declared their support for Anies Baswedan at the Monument on Jalan Trunojoyo Sampang.⁵³ The support of Madurese *ulama* or *kiai* for Anies Baswedan in the 2024 presidential election allows Anies to have a big chance of winning in Madura. Moreover, politics is dynamic, initially the *ulama* and *kiai* Madura supported Prabowo in the 2014-2019 presidential election and switched their direction to support Anies in the 2024 presidential election, the impact of Prabowo's joining the cabinet of *Indonesia Maju*.

It is possible that the presidential election in Madura 2024 will be won by Ganjar Pranowo, even though the PDIP party supporting Ganjar has never been the dominant voice during the presidential election. The proof is that Joko Widodo from 2014-2019 always lost in Madura. However, once again politics is dynamic, especially in the modern era, everything can be accessed and searched. The Madurese can see the progress of Central Java Province from all aspects, the result of Ganjar Pranowo's hard work during his five years as leader of Central Java. This indicator allows Ganjar Pranowo to have a chance of winning the upcoming 2024 Madura presidential election.

CONCLUSION

From the explanation above, it can be concluded that the role of the *kiai* in the political vortex in Madura after the 1998-2019 New Order played a role as an actor in winning elections, both in the regional elections (*Pilkada/Pemilihan kepala daerah*) and the presidential election (*Pilpres/pemilihan presiden*). Not only that, *kiai* plays a role as a practical political actor. The proof is that four regencies in Madura were once led by a descendant of a charismatic *kiai* and had a great influence on Madurese society. The rich factor plays a role and is influential in politics in Madura because the Madurese people respect the *kiai* so highly and are

⁵² Kba News, 'Empat Ulama Kharismatis Madura Deklarasikan Dukungan Kepada Anies Baswedan', 2013, <https://kbanews.com/hot-news/empat-ulama-kharismatis-madura-deklarasikan-dukungan-kepada-anies-baswedan/>.

⁵³ Bhirawa Online, 'Ulama Dan Kiai Madura Deklarasikan Dukungan Anies Baswedan Jadi Presiden 2024', 2023, <https://www.harianbhirawa.co.id/ulama-dan-kiai-madura-deklarasikan-dukungan-anies-baswedan-jadi-presiden-2024/>.

believed to be people who understand religion, so all kinds of problems in the Madurese always ask for the *kiai*'s direction, including the issue of political choices. *kiai* as religious figures are always present in every community problem that comes into contact with political activities. The involvement of the *kiai* in the political arena is to fight for the rights of the people who have not been realized and to ground the religious tradition of *Ahlassunnah wal jamaah* in Madura which is affiliated with the *Nahdlatul Ulama* (NU) organization with the characteristics of religious traditions, *maulidan*, *tahlilan*, and *sholawatan*.

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